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Abstract
In 2012, Home Secretary Theresa May told a newspaper that she wanted 
to create a ‘really hostile environment’ for irregular migrants in the UK. 
Although the phrase has since mutated to refer to generalised state-
led marginalisation of immigrants, this article argues that the hostile 
environment is a specific policy approach, and one with profound signifi-
cance for the UK’s border practices. We trace the ‘hostile environment’ 
phrase, exposing its origins in other policy realms, charting its evolution 
into immigration, identifying the key components and critically review-
ing the corresponding legislation. The article analyses the impact and 
consequences of the hostile environment, appraising the costs to public 
health and safety, the public purse, individual vulnerability and mar-
ginalisation, and wider social relations. We conclude by identifying the 
fundamental flaws of the policy approach, arguing that they led to the 
2018 Windrush scandal and risk creating similar problems for European 
Economic Area nationals after Brexit.
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Introduction
From indefinite immigration detention to the controversially-high income 
threshold for sponsoring a foreign spouse, the UK has notoriously harsh 
immigration policies. These policies became particularly exclusionary and 
punitive during the early years of the 21st century; feeding-into and fed-
by high levels of public and media concern over immigration. Theresa May 
became Home Secretary in 2010 and was responsible for implementing the 
infamous commitment to reduce net migration to the ‘tens of thousands’. 
This pledge – unwise and evidently unachievable – has coloured subsequent 
immigration policy development, with May introducing a stream of policy 
changes seeking to reduce arrivals of migrants and increase removals. It was 
within this maelstrom of new policies that May gave a newspaper interview in 
2012 announcing the introduction of a ‘really hostile environment for illegal 
migration’ (Kirkup and Winnett, 2012).
The ‘hostile environment’ is difficult to pin down. Unlike most major 
policy reforms, no White Paper presaged its introduction. There is no central 
policy document, no official definition nor clear aims and objectives. The 
policies are spread across various Immigration Acts, rules and regulations 
and affect numerous sectors and policy arenas. The term’s meaning is also 
shifting, expanding in academic and media discourses to refer to a general 
stance of nastiness towards migrants. We argue that this linguistic slippage 
obscures a policy approach that is much more specific and significant. The 
hostile environment heralded a step-change expansion of everyday borders 
that is unprecedented in the UK in its scale, scope and speed. This article 
offers a definition of the hostile environment that identifies its most perti-
nent components by tracing the policy origins and evolutions, and critically 
reviewing the services and sectors that we identify as (currently) constituting 
the strategy. The article then critically appraises the policy strategy’s success 
and outcomes, including impacts to individuals and society. We conclude 
by identifying the core and underlying problems of the hostile environment, 
demonstrating their role in the Windrush scandal 2018 and potential for a 
repeat after Brexit.
Origins
In her 2012 newspaper interview announcing the hostile environment, May 
claimed that foreign nationals believe ‘that they can come here and overstay 
because they’re able to access everything they need’ (Kirkup and Winnett, 
2012). As part of a wider commitment to slash immigration figures, May 
described a new approach intended to dissuade illegal residence in the UK 
by preventing people from accessing basic services. It meant the diffusion of 
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national borders and their enforcement away from the external edges of the 
polity and sole hands of trained state officials, into everyday spaces within 
the interior of state territories, requiring migrants to prove frequently their 
right to reside during everyday life (Balibar, 2004; Johnson and Jones, 
2016), including through the ‘biometric borders’ of databases and algo-
rithms (Amoore, 2006; Lyon, 2009). With negligible numbers of immigra-
tion offences actually prosecuted (just 500–600 each year, with convictions 
even lower (Aliverti, 2016)), and numbers of forced removals declining each 
year, it was tacit recognition of the limits of direct governmental immigra-
tion enforcement and the decision to significantly broaden responsibility for 
UK border controls.
Over the last few decades, several countries have pursued polices that 
bring local government officials, public servants, police officers, private com-
panies and even ‘ordinary people’ into controlling migration. Such processes 
of ‘devolution’ (Coleman, 2009; Lahav, 1998) or ‘vernacularisation’ (Cooper 
et al., 2016) of immigration enforcement have a relatively long history in the 
USA but a more recent and slow-paced development in the UK (Flynn, 2005; 
Yuval-Davis et al., 2019). This article uses the term ‘deputisation’ to describe 
the co-opting of organisations and people as de facto immigration officers 
(Walsh, 2013, 2014), a concept that has also been used in the context of the 
expanding USA criminal justice system (Wilson Gilmore, 2007). Through 
deputisation, a medley of actors are made ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 
1980), responsible for enacting – and interpreting – immigration policy on 
the ground.
In creating the hostile environment, Ministers introduced policy changes 
that dramatically diffused the immigration system across the breadth of soci-
ety. The striking ambition for the scope of the hostile environment is illus-
trated by the range of government departments brought together after May’s 
interview to assess the rules on migrants’ access to work and services. Mem-
bers of this ‘Hostile Environment Working Group’ included the Ministers 
of State for Immigration, Government Policy, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, Justice, Employment, Housing and Local Government, Schools, Care 
Services, Universities and Science, as well as the Parliamentary Under-Secre-
tary of States for Health and for Transport, and the Exchequer Secretary to the 
Treasury (ICIBI, 2016a: 4.2).
As part of a superficial rebrand, the working group was later renamed 
the more anodyne ‘Inter-Ministerial Group on Migrants’ Access to Benefits 
and Public Services’, and the whole approach is now usually officially referred 
to as ‘the compliant environment.’ The ‘hostile environment’ terminology, 
however, is extremely important, and not only for openly acknowledging the 
UK’s punitive approach to migration management. The phrase is a recent 
addition to migration policy parlance and strongly attributed to Theresa 
May, although a passing reference was made by the previous, Labour, govern-
4 C r i t i c a l  S o c i a l  P o l i c y  00(0)
ment a couple of years earlier in an immigration white paper (UKBA, 2010). 
The ‘hostile environment’ phrase has a longer history elsewhere in the Home 
Office, where it originally referred to dangerous overseas locations, used for 
example in government guidance for journalists working in warzones. After 
9/11, the term was primarily used to refer to the disruption of ‘soft’ sup-
port and funding for terrorism and serious and organised crime, for example 
by requiring banks to carry out regulatory checks on customers (e.g. Home 
Office, 2004).
Appropriating a phrase that was previously only used to refer to war-
fare, terrorists and serious criminals (and still continues to be used in these 
contexts, see Hansard, 2015, 2017a), May extended a policy approach from 
one Home Office team (Organised Crime and Counter Terrorism), to another 
(Borders and Immigration). By so doing, she fed the delegitimisation, crimi-
nalisation and securitisation of mobility, as well as fundamentally altering the 
UK’s border practices.
Defining the UK’s hostile environment for migrants
The UK’s immigration system developed directly out of the collapse of the 
British Empire and reflected a political drive to control the entry of racialised 
and dispossessed former colonial peoples (El-Enany, 2020). It has long been 
characterised by restrictive policies, absurdly complex and ever-changing 
Immigration Rules, harsh and arbitrary decision-making, criminalisation of 
mobility and indefinite immigration detention (Goodfellow, 2019). Political 
rhetoric and policy-making on immigration has become especially harsh in 
recent years (Goodfellow, 2019; Yeo, 2020). Some of May’s other initiatives, 
for example, included Operation Nexus (under which people are deported as 
‘foreign criminals’ on the basis of police contact rather than conviction (Griffiths, 
2017)), and Operation Vaken, under which vans with ‘Go home or face arrest’ 
billboard messages were driven around ethnically-diverse London boroughs, 
adverts placed in minority ethnic newspapers, and immigration enforcement 
vehicles re-branded to resemble police cars (Jones et al., 2017)).
Although journalists, politicians and academics often use the hostile 
environment label to refer to broadly marginalising, criminalising and puni-
tive policies and practices, we argue that the hostile environment for migrants 
is more than just hostile policies. May’s conceptualisation does not exist in a 
White Paper nor central policy document, but we can infer a definition from 
its origins and evolution. It is made up of multiple components which are 
spread across sectors and operate independently, but that share core charac-
teristics and function cumulatively to produce a specific and holistic policy 
strategy. We argue that the defining feature of May’s hostile environment for 
migrants is the ‘deputisation’ of border enforcement to third parties. Giving 
non-state actors responsibility for state functions is also seen in the hostile 
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environment for terrorists and serious criminals, but in an immigration con-
text those co-opted are not just in financial services. A sweeping range of 
public servants, agencies, companies, private organisations and members of 
the public are now obliged to check people’s immigration status and enforce 
immigration-related restrictions. The significance of these policy develop-
ments for redrawing UK border practices and social relations risk being lost 
by loose use of the ‘hostile environment’ phrase to refer to generalised state 
hostility.
Precursors to the hostile environment for 
migrants
Specific aspects of the immigration system, notably enforcement activities 
such as immigration detention, have been ‘outsourced’ to large multinational 
security companies for several decades. Securicor, for example, was contracted 
to operate the first detention centre, Harmondsworth, in 1970. Until very 
recently, however, most of the immigration system has been directly con-
trolled by the Home Office, with just a small number of other state actors 
involved. Local Authorities, for example, have checked immigration status 
in relation to welfare benefits and social housing since the 1990s. Private, 
non-state actors were brought in by the Immigration (Carriers’ Liability) 
Act 1987, which required ferry companies and airlines to check immigra-
tion status before bringing passengers to the UK, fining them for anyone 
without permission to enter. Nearly a decade later, employers were brought 
into checking immigration status through the Asylum and Immigration Act 
1996, which introduced the criminal offence of employing a someone without 
permission to live and work in the UK (although in practice the provision was 
little known and rarely enforced). However, beyond welfare assessors, ferry 
companies, airlines and employers, the use of third parties to enact border 
functions remained highly limited in the UK until well into the 21st century.
The Labour government of 1997–2010 took a crucial step towards hos-
tile environment-style deputisation of third parties, albeit in a limited and 
tempered way. Labour’s 2007 immigration policy included plans to create an 
‘increasingly uncomfortable environment’ for ‘illegal migrants’ by denying 
them ‘the benefits and privileges of life in the UK’ and creating ‘crime part-
nerships’ across government agencies and public services (Home Office, 2007: 
17). The pressure on employers to check immigration status was strengthened 
by the Immigration, Nationality and Asylum Act 2006, which increased civil 
fines and amended the criminal sanction. Prosecutions remained extremely 
low however, with fewer than 100 brought under the 2006 Act between 2009-
14 (Hansard, 2014). In 2008, Labour created the Points Based System through 
secondary legislation, requiring ‘sponsors’ (employers and education providers 
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like private schools and higher and further education institutions), to monitor 
foreign employees and students, report their behaviour to the Home Office and 
dismiss anyone breaching the rules (e.g. missing lectures, taking unauthorised 
absences). Failure to comply leads to loss of sponsor licence, being unable to 
recruit new foreign workers/students and having to dismiss existing ones, with 
potentially catastrophic business consequences.
These policies were the direct precursor of the hostile environment, but a 
far cry from the contemporary approach. Under Labour, the strategy was lim-
ited in scope and its punitive elements counterbalanced with a sliding scale of 
punishment and an intention to simplify the immigration rules to make them 
‘easier to obey’ (Home Office, 2007: 17). In 2012, under the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat coalition, the strategy shifted from ‘uncomfortable’ to ‘hos-
tile’ and the protective aspects abandoned. The range of third parties co-opted 
into immigration policing increased dramatically, rapidly diffusing the reach 
of the immigration system across sectors and society, to create what has been 
described as ‘state racial terror’ (El-Enany, 2020).
Legislation and policy
A year after May’s newspaper interview, the Interventions and Sanctions 
Directorate (ISD) was established within the Home Office’s Enforcement 
Directorate. From a Freedom of Information request we know that the ISD is 
responsible for overseeing the operationalisation of the hostile environment 
and that it works with ‘partners’ across government and public and private 
sectors, to ensure that access to benefits and services is restricted for irreg-
ular migrants and that sanctions are enforced (WhatDoTheyKnow, 2013). 
Four months later, a new Immigration Bill formalised the approach. The 
Bill became the Immigration Act 2014 and was subsequently fortified and 
extended by the Immigration Act 2016. These two Acts make a wide range of 
third parties – including employers, bank employees, marriage registrars, the 
Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) and landlords - responsible for 
conducting immigration status checks, refusing people services/jobs/accom-
modation, and sharing migrants’ data with the Home Office.
employers: Although employers were notionally brought into immigra-
tion policing through legislation in 1996 and 2006, in practice their involve-
ment remained extremely limited until recently (Bloch et al., 2014). In 2014, 
secondary legislation doubled the maximum fine of employing an illegal worker 
to £20,000 per employee, and enforcement activity against employers (initially) 
dramatically increased (see Figure 1). The Immigration Act 2016 widened 
the criminal offence (from knowingly employing an illegal worker to having 
reasonable cause to believe that they are not permitted to work) and length-
ened the associated prison sentence. The hostile environment has succeeded 
where previous legislation failed; firmly embedding the practice of conducting 
G r i f f i t h s  a n d  Ye o  7
immigration checks on employees into workplace culture, even though – con-
trary to popular belief – such checks are not actually legally obligatory.
Banks: In her 2012 interview, Theresa May pledged to restrict migrants’ 
‘access to financial services’, noting the importance of banking for everyday 
life. The Immigration Act 2014 made banks and building societies respon-
sible for checking the immigration status of new customers and declining 
accounts to irregular migrants. The Immigration Act 2016 extended this 
duty by requiring the closure of existing accounts. However, in one of the first 
signs of a re-evaluation of the hostile environment approach, in May 2018, 
the new Home Secretary Sajid Javid announced suspension of checks on, and 
closures of, existing accounts (Grierson, 2018a).
landlords: The Immigration Act 2014 introduced a new concept: the 
‘right to rent’, making landlords responsible for checking the immigration 
status of tenants. They face civil penalties up to £3,000 for each tenant whose 
immigration status does not allow them to rent. The Immigration Act 2016 
went further, criminalising landlords and housing agents for renting to some-
one knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that they do not have the right 
to rent.
DVla: The Immigration Act 2014 requires the DVLA to revoke driving 
licenses issued to people without sufficient leave to remain and bulk data-
share with the Home Office. The scale of licence revocations is significant, 
with the Home Office making almost 10,000 requests to the DVLA in 2015 









2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Number of penalties issued to employers
figure 1. Source: Compiled from Home Office statistics on  illegal working civil 
penalties issued to employers.
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of driving when unlawfully in the UK and gave immigration and police offi-
cers new powers to seize licences and vehicles.
Marriage registrars: The Immigration Act 2014 extended the duties 
of marriage registrars to check and report on the nationality and immigra-
tion status of all prospective couples. To accommodate these checks, the Act 
doubled the marriage notification period from 14 to 28 days for all marriages 
in the UK.
Alongside these two Immigration Acts, regulations and secondary leg-
islation have brought additional essential frontline personnel - in health, 
education, policing and homelessness services - into the immigration sphere. 
They also strengthened the immigration functions of Local Authorities, with 
various teams adopting new immigration roles and developing partnerships 
with the Home Office, including those managing alcohol and taxi licensing, 
environmental health, building and planning, street-market regulation and 
neighbourhood wardens (Corporate Watch, 2017a). Some Local Authorities 
have even voluntarily contracted the Home Office to embed immigration offi-
cials in their organisations so as to conduct immigration status checks (Savage 
and Cadwalladr, 2019).
Police: The police have long argued that their involvement in immigra-
tion matters has a detrimental impact on policing and community relations. 
So although immigration offences such as overstaying visas and illegal entry 
were criminalised by the 1971 Immigration Act, they were rarely enforced 
by the police, reflected by extremely low prosecution and conviction rates. In 
2012, however, a new ‘joint working operation’ between the police and Home 
Office codenamed Operation Nexus was piloted in London, before being 
rolled-out nationally. The details vary by region, but typically include having 
immigration officials embedded at police stations, police officers checking 
people’s immigration status, and police contact and intelligence used to build 
deportation cases (Griffiths, 2017; Parmar, 2019).
healthcare: Non-residents have been susceptible to NHS (National 
Health Service) charges since 1977, but in practice this was rarely enforced. 
In 2015, The National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Reg-
ulations introduced new treatment fees (often required in advance) as well 
as routine immigration checks on patients by hospital and community 
health service staff (Feldman, 2020). The Home Office also established 
data-sharing agreements with NHS Digital and the Department of Health 
and Social Care, allowing it to obtain confidential non-clinical personal 
information, like addresses, of patients suspected of not having immigra-
tion status in the UK. Previously the NHS could only disclose patient 
information to third parties in connection to criminal investigations. In 
2016, the Home Office made requests for nine thousand patients’ data, 
leading to roughly six thousand people traced by immigration enforcement 
(Travis, 2017b).
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schools: Since 2008, universities and private schools have had to carry 
out immigration checks under the Points Based System. In June 2015, the 
Department for Education (DfE) and Home Office quietly signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding under which the DfE shares the personal details of 
1,500 school children a month in order to help identify immigration offenders 
(Gayle, 2016). The data is drawn from school censuses and includes pupils’ 
names and addresses, and school and attendance records. In September 2016, 
new regulations came into force adding nationality, country of birth, and pro-
ficiency in speaking, reading, and writing in English to the data collected in 
school censuses and collated in the national pupil database.
homelessness services: Under the hostile environment, local councils, 
London boroughs, the Greater London Authority and even charities pass on 
information about rough sleepers (including location and nationality) to the 
Home Office and conduct joint ‘rough sleeper patrols’ with Immigration 
Enforcement officers (Corporate Watch, 2017b). Collaborative street patrols 
involving well-known destitution charities were first piloted in 2010–2011 
(‘Operation Ark’) but grew significantly following a second London pilot in 
2015 (‘Operation Adoze’).
Evaluating the hostile environment
Given the extensive scope of the hostile environment across services and sec-
tors, we might expect the policy approach to be carefully designed, evidenced 
and assessed. And yet, until 2018, there was remarkably little governmen-
tal monitoring, political scrutiny, media concern or public or parliamentary 
debate. With no White Paper underlying the policies, no clear aims or objec-
tives and data-sharing Memorandums of Understanding only released as a 
result of Freedom of Information requests, months after operationalisation 
(Liberty, 2018: 11), it might appear that low public awareness was inten-
tionally maintained. External reviewers have repeatedly criticised the Home 
Office for failing to specify policy objectives or measure the impacts of the 
hostile environment. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immi-
gration criticised Ministers for not asking the key questions, creating pressure 
to deliver specific outcomes, setting targets for evaluation, assessing impacts 
or acting on information generated by the policies (ICIBI, 2016a: 7.9). Four 
years later, the Windrush Lessons Learned Review found that the department 
is still failing to monitor or properly evaluate the effectiveness and impact of 
the measures (Williams, 2020: 140), and the National Audit Office concluded 
that the Home Office cannot assess whether the policies have any meaningful 
impact on voluntary departures (NAO, 2020).
In this section we examine the impact and repercussions of the hostile 
environment. The task is complicated by a lack of data and uncertainty over 
the official objectives, although by piecing together clues from May’s 2012 
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interview, other Ministerial statements and the Immigration Bill factsheet, 
we can infer that the policy aims are: to discourage people from coming to 
the UK, to stop them overstaying visas, to prevent irregular migrants from 
accessing services and drawing from the public purse, and to make it easier 
to remove people.
The lack of clear objectives or official monitoring might suggest that 
the policy approach is propelled less by practical considerations around cost, 
resources and numbers, than ‘feeling rules’ appealing to notions of belong-
ing, fairness and national sovereignty (Hochschild, 2003; Sirriyeh, 2015). It 
is notable that the original impact assessments stated that the Home Office 
‘expected’ to increase the number of voluntary departures but that this could 
‘not be quantified’, and simply that it was ‘thought that the benefits would 
exceed the costs’ (IfG, 2019: 38). Senior Home Office officials have said that 
even if evidence showed that the policies were ineffective, the approach would 
not be abandoned because it is ‘the right thing to do’ and that ‘the public 
would not find it acceptable’ for irregular migrants to access the same benefits 
and services as citizens and lawful migrants (ICIBI, 2016a: 7.8). Theresa May 
often justified the hostile environment using the concept of fairness, includ-
ing asserting that ‘most people’ in the UK think that it is not fair for irregular 
migrants ‘to continue to exist as everybody else does’ (Travis, 2013). The 
hostile environment, then, may be better understood as an ideological stance, 
than an evidence-based, ends-driven policy approach, but must nonetheless 
have its costs and repercussions properly assessed.
Impact on individuals
One aim of the hostile environment is clearly being met: access to services 
is obstructed for those without immigration status. The number of people 
affected is unknown, not least because many are too precarious to seek public-
ity or redress, but it is estimated that there are around 800,000–1.2 million 
unauthorised migrants in the UK (Pew, 2019). However, the hostile environ-
ment also harms migrants who do have lawful immigration status as well as 
some British citizens (discussed below). The human impact can be extreme, 
as was illustrated by the plight of long-term, lawful residents in what became 
known as the ‘Windrush scandal’ after the ship that brought Caribbean work-
ers to the UK in 1948 (see below). Many people were left destitute, some died 
prematurely and others were forced to leave the UK for countries they had 
left decades previously. The impact on newly arrived migrants may be even 
more severe, as they are less likely to have the socialisation, culturalisation and 
emergency support networks of long-term residents.
The human impacts of the hostile environment are wide ranging and 
potentially extreme. Reduced income through loss or denial of employment 
triggers a cascade of serious problems. Accommodation may be lost, a prob-
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lem exacerbated by the ‘right to rent’ scheme and denied access to the social 
welfare safety net. Those affected are forced into becoming street homeless 
(where they are vulnerable to being referred to the Home Office) or dependent 
upon friends and charity. Some engage in irregular work, where the lack of 
employment rights and protections create a hyper-vulnerable ‘super-exploit-
able workforce’ at risk of modern slavery (Bloch et  al., 2014; Lewis et  al., 
2017). Barriers to marriage interferes with people’s right to respect for their 
private and family life, and families may be afraid of vaccinating children or 
enrolling them in schools. There is evidence that some vulnerable people, 
including pregnant women and victims of abuse, are too afraid of immigra-
tion repercussions or excessive costs to seek care (Feldman, 2020; Gentleman, 
2019). Others are turned away when they try, as was the case with a man that 
helped bring to light the Windrush scandal after he was incorrectly denied 
cancer treatment after 44 years of lawful residence (Gentleman, 2019).
It is important to remember that these dire impacts are not accidental 
side effects of the hostile environment but are central to its operation. Indeed, 
the effectiveness of ‘everyday borders’ is the production of generalised feelings 
of instability and anxiety (Flynn, 2015), which creates chronically insecure 
and dehumanised, ‘deportable’, people (de Genova, 2002).
Migration numbers
Researchers have shown that the deterrent effect of punitive policies and sanc-
tions on immigration rates is negligible (Bloch et al., 2014; Duvell et al., 2018). 
Certainly, the (scant) evidence available does not suggest that the hostile envi-
ronment is succeeding in deterring arrivals or overstaying, nor encouraging 
departures. Whilst it is difficult to assess the impact of individual policies from 
national statistics, it is evident that net migration has been increasing since the 
hostile environment began. Unauthorised migration has probably remained 
static in this period (Pew, 2019). According to Home Office statistics, both 
enforced and voluntary departures are actually decreasing each year (Figure 2).
In any case, the ‘illegal immigrants’ that the policies are designed to 
tackle are not an easily-definable or static group, but are produced through 
hostile environment policies, document checks and immigration-imbued ser-
vice interactions (York, 2018). It is becoming increasingly easy to lose one’s 
lawful immigration status, including through increased cost and complexity 
of immigration applications, inflexible rules, Home Office data errors and 
reductions of legal aid and grounds of appeal, and increasingly difficult to 
regularise one’s status (Yeo, 2020).
Financial costs
The hostile environment might prevent unlawful migrants from drawing from 
the public purse but is unlikely to be saving the tax-payer money overall. The 
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Home Office spreads some of its costs through deputisation but also faces new 
costs, such as the ISD’s budget (£5.5 million in 2016 (ICIBI, 2016a: 4.14)). 
Much of the hostile environment’s costs however fall on other branches of the 
state, such as schools, hospitals and Local Authorities, as well as third par-
ties like employers, banks and landlords, and ultimately therefore the general 
public. Although the hostile environment could generate revenues, it seems 
that these are outweighed by its implementation costs. Civil penalties, for 
example, have proven extremely difficult to enforce (Casciani, 2013), and the 
NHS spends more money chasing overseas patients than it recovers (and often 
eventually discovers that the person was actually entitled to free healthcare 
after all) (Hansard, 2017b).
Costs for society
In addition to catastrophic individual impacts, the creation of an underclass 
of illegalised people unable to engage with basic or emergency services has 
risks for the wider society. As also found in the USA (Walsh, 2014), depu-
tised immigration checking presents risks for public safety and security, puts 
strains on community relations and undermines citizenship by encouraging 
a climate of fear and hostility. Public health is threatened when people are 
afraid or prohibited from accessing medical treatment, vaccinations, ante-
natal care (Potter, 2017, Schweitzer, 2016) or ‘track and trace’ programs, 
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Enforced and voluntary returns 2004-2018
Enforced Voluntary
figure 2. Source: Compiled from Home Office Quarterly Immigration Statistics 
(June 2019, table ‘returns1’)..
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reduced and hit-and-run accidents made more likely by depriving people of 
driving licences (Lueders et al., 2017). Giving the police immigration roles 
risks police/community relations and creates barriers for witnesses and vic-
tims to report crimes (Laville, 2013). Deputising immigration management 
also weakens government accountability and responsibility (Walsh, 2013) by 
shifting the – heavy – burden of enforcing refusals and restrictions.
The hostile environment also impacts society by legitimising and even 
encouraging racism and xenophobia. Concerns over potential discrimination 
have been raised from the beginning, including by NGOs, lawyers and Brit-
ish and Commonwealth politicians. For example, Communities and Local 
Government Minister Eric Pickles voiced concerns in 2013 that the landlord 
provisions would impinge on ‘anyone foreign-looking’ and several Caribbean 
foreign ministers warned of disproportional impacts on Afro-Caribbean UK 
residents (Grierson, 2018b). NGOs made similar warnings: the JCWI called 
the 2013 Immigration Bill a ‘travesty’ that would ‘divide society’, and the 
Immigration Law Practitioners Association warned it would be ‘intrusive, 
bullying, ineffective and expensive and likely racist and unlawful to boot’ 
(Travis, 2013).
It seems that these fears were valid. Ethnic minorities are disproportion-
ately subject to immigration checks and having their residence questioned. 
Banks are reluctant to open accounts for foreign nationals, including those 
with lawful but limited leave to remain (Travis, 2017a), universities are 
accused of exceeding their statutory duties and acting in discriminatory ways, 
including by rejecting students from ‘high risk’ countries (Times Higher 
Education, 2015) and performing discriminatory attendance monitoring 
(Liberty, 2018: 18). A Home Office-commissioned assessment of the ‘right 
to rent’ pilot found landlords making discriminatory comments and dispro-
portionately requiring ethnic minorities to prove their immigration status 
(Home Office, 2015). One NGO’s poll of landlords found 44% would not 
rent to people who ‘appear to be immigrants’ (Shelter, 2016), and another 
found that half of landlords report being less likely to rent to foreign nationals 
and 58% refusing ethnic minorities without British passports (JCWI, 2015). 
In April 2020, the Court of Appeal found that the ‘right to rent’ scheme 
causes landlords to discriminate, although held that it was nonetheless lawful.
The risk of institutional discrimination translating into uneven immi-
gration enforcement through the hostile environment is perhaps particularly 
high with the police. Evidence shows the overrepresentation of ethnic minori-
ties at every level of the criminal justice system, including stop-and-searches 
and traffic stops (Bowling and Philips, 2002). With a case for deportation 
now potentially built upon a person’s police file rather than criminal convic-
tion, under Operation Nexus and the hostile environment, deportation can be 
justified through a medley of police encounters and arrests, even if they were 
for cautionable offences, made in error or did not lead to charges (Luqmani 
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Thompson and Partners, 2014: 7). The brunt is borne by ethnic minorities, 
as well as some marginalised white groups, such as east Europeans and Roma. 
Polish and Romanian police officers, for example, were seconded to London 
under Operation Nexus to target their nationals for removal (Bloomer, 2016). 
The destitution polices have also largely focused on rough-sleeping Europeans 
(Taylor, 2018).
The hostile environment not only legitimises and encourages discrimina-
tion by those to whom it deputises, but is an ongoing expression of the colo-
nial system of racial ordering (El-Enany, 2020).
Flawed foundations
The hostile environment for migrants is flawed. It has little impact on migra-
tion numbers, and yet has considerable human, financial, social and public 
safety costs. This section argues that the core problems relate to faulty under-
lying assumptions, the selectivity of immigration checks and poor-quality 
data. These fundamental flaws encourage overzealous and discriminatory 
application and result in high ‘collateral damage’ to countless lawful migrants 
and British citizens.
Accuracy of data
Unlike many countries, the UK does not have a central population database or 
identity card system. Third parties conducting checks are dependent, there-
fore, upon the quality of Home Office data to verify people’s nationality or 
immigration status. It is concerning, then, that the department is regularly 
criticised for its databases being outdated and not up to standard (IfG, 2019: 
34), holding information that is incomplete or inaccurate, and demonstrating 
high error rates and recordkeeping failings (ICIBI, 2016a: 2.7; ICIBI, 2016b). 
The Home Office’s poor-quality data is passed onto the third parties enacting 
hostile environment restrictions, with potentially catastrophic implications 
for individuals. An error rate of almost 10% was found of customers iden-
tified as disqualified for banking by the Home Office (ICIBI, 2016a), and 
yet the Home Office instructed banks and building societies to only update 
records ‘in exceptional circumstances’ and that ‘the default position should 
be to refuse’ to doublecheck decisions (Home Office, 2017: 3) (and even then 
it takes up to a year to reopen bank accounts recognised as wrongly closed 
(Liberty, 2018: 25)). Poor Home Office data has been shown to result in the 
DVLA issuing driving licences to people whose immigration status should 
preclude them (ICIBI, 2016a: 2.8), whilst simultaneously incorrectly revok-
ing hundreds of driving licences each year from those entitled to them (e.g. 
259 licences were reinstated in 2015 (ICIBI, 2016a: 5.62)). The risks relating 
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to poor-quality or biased data capture, retention and utilisation are exacer-
bated by assumptions that data is neutral and accurate, and the barriers to 
reconsideration and redress.
Selective checks
Unlike the blanket identity checks required to access services in many coun-
tries, the UK’s hostile environment does not impose universal or mandatory 
checks. Third parties are not obliged to check everyone’s documents, rather 
they are penalised if they provide jobs/accommodation/services to foreign 
nationals without the correct immigration status. This is an important dis-
tinction. It encourages racial profiling by those deputised, by incentivis-
ing discriminatory application of checks on those deemed ‘foreign’ by their 
appearance, name or accent. Like other ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky, 
1980), these de facto immigration officers wield considerable discretionary 
power and the authority for ad hoc interpretation of public policy.
The types of sectors brought into the hostile environment result in a dis-
proportionate impact on those whose socio-economic background, age, health 
or ethnicity brings them into contact with public services or the criminal 
justice system, or who suffer precarious accommodation or employment. The 
‘Good Citizen’ (white, male, middle class, home-owning and in possession 
of a passport) is likely to be relatively unaffected (Anderson, 2013). Under-
standing the uneven impacts of the hostile environment requires an inter-
sectional approach that acknowledges the interrelation of variables such as 
gender, ethnicity and socio-economic status (Yuval-Davis et al., 2019). The 
hostile environment clearly encompasses both classed and racialised biases, as 
is evident across the British immigration system (e.g. Bhui, 2016; Griffiths, 
2017; Mayblin, 2017; Parmar, 2019; Sirriyeh, 2015); and reflects its origins 
in controlling the movement of racialised poor people from former colonies 
(El-Enany, 2020).
Undocumented vs. unlawful
The fatal flaw at the heart of the hostile environment is the conflation of 
being undocumented and unlawfully-resident. It is assumed that those who 
have legal immigration status will have documentary evidence, so that a lack 
of ‘papers’ equates to a lack of immigration status. However, although these 
populations overlap, they are not synonymous. Many lawful migrants do not 
possess documentary proof of their identity or immigration status, or only 
have expired documents. Indeed, millions of British citizens do not have pass-
ports, with 17% of UK residents (about 10 million people) in the 2011 census 
reporting that they did not have one. With Britons who have refused or failed 
to prove their nationality to employers being fired under hostile environment 
16 C r i t i c a l  S o c i a l  P o l i c y  00(0)
policies, some are applying for passports simply in order to live and work in 
their own country. And as noted, the requirement to prove one’s lawful status 
is not experienced equally.
Overzealous application
Serious problems arise from this mix of selective application of immigra-
tion checks coupled with erroneous assumptions over the quality of Home 
Office data and likelihood that people have documents. These include over-
enthusiastic third parties executing excessive and discriminatory checks and 
restrictions, as has also been shown for other national contexts of deputised 
immigration controls (Walsh, 2013). The hostile environment encourage 
third parties to treat an excessively broad and racialised group of people as 
unlawful migrants and to go beyond their legal obligations to overly-comply 
or even collaborate with the Home Office, as some universities and companies 
are accused of doing (e.g. by facilitating Home Office workplace raids by 
arranging fake meetings for their employers). There is evidence that people 
are being denied access to primary healthcare (to which everyone is entitled), or 
wrongly turned away from hospitals and maternity care (Bulman, 2017; Feld-
man, 2020). Marriage registrars refer thousands more couples to the Home 
Office for investigation each year than originally anticipated (Home Office, 
2013), even though three quarters are subsequently permitted to marry (ICIBI 
2016c). Lawful migrants, European Economic Area (EEA) nationals and Brit-
ish citizens are caught up in the process. Such harm is felt unevenly across 
society, particularly affecting those most likely to be subject to checks or 
most unlikely to have documentary evidence of their identity or immigration 
status, such as asylum seekers (Cassidy, 2019), pensioners, precarious workers 
and those with chaotic lives, low income or health problems. By encouraging 
existing and new forms of exclusion and risk-profiling, the hostile environ-
ment reinforces hierarchies of belonging and differentiated membership.
In a few cases, third party cooperation is encouraged through financial 
reward. Homelessness charities, for example, are contracted through a ‘pay-
ment by numbers’ scheme under which funding is tied to the number of 
rough sleepers helped to leave the UK (Corporate Watch, 2017b). Local 
Authorities must engage in Home Office immigration enforcement projects 
if they wish to bid for the Controlling Migration Fund (Corporate Watch, 
2017a). But primarily, over-compliance from deputies is encouraged 
through threats of high sanctions coupled with the extreme uncertainty 
and complexity of the immigration system. It is notoriously difficult to 
assess immigration status and identity documents, and to stay abreast of the 
frequently-changing policies. Hostile environment guidance for employers 
and landlords, for example, are long and complicated 40-page booklets (e.g. 
Home Office, 2020).
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And yet mistakes result in severe sanctions like forfeited sponsorship 
licences, civil fines, criminal charges and imprisonment. Employers, for 
example, face a £20,000 penalty or five-year prison sentence for hiring 
unlawful workers, but no incentive for employing eligible foreign nation-
als and no effective sanction for discriminatory hiring or checking prac-
tices. They – like other third parties – are often unsure exactly what is 
required (e.g. incorrectly believing that they are legally obliged to conduct 
immigration checks rather than just being forbidden from hiring some-
one without permission to work). The uncertainty pervading the hostile 
environment is sustained by government, including through the creation 
of overly-broad criminal offences that are intended to be operationalised 
selectively. Providers of safe housing to victims of abuse, for example, have 
only been reassured that they probably will not be prosecuted for housing 
irregular migrants.
These factors encourage third parties to adopt over-cautious approaches 
to immigration checks and restrictions, affecting many more people than 
‘just’ those unlawfully-present, and doing so in discriminatory ways.
The Windrush scandal
From 2017, the media began to cover the plight of long-standing, lawful resi-
dents being brought into the immigration gaze through the hostile environ-
ment (Gentleman, 2019). Eventually termed ‘the Windrush scandal’, these 
cases illuminated the human repercussions of the system’s flaws, particularly 
the false assumption that lawful residents have documentary evidence, and 
the racialised and classed biases encouraged by selective checks and high sanc-
tions facing those ‘deputised’. Those affected arrived in the UK decades ago, 
with a right of entry and residence as ‘Citizens of the United Kingdom and 
Colonies’ or Commonwealth citizens. They retained their rights after the 
Immigration Act 1971 removed them from new entrants, but these rights 
were protected in law, not physical documents. This caused little problem 
until the hostile environment. These residents (many elderly, working class 
and minority ethnic), were particularly likely to face immigration checks, but 
found themselves unable to prove their lawful status (for which they carried 
the burden of proof (Bawdon, 2014; York, 2018)). Scores lost jobs and homes, 
were denied pensions or healthcare, even detained or deported.
The diffusion of everyday borders can offer opportunity for collaboration 
and resistance (Cooper et al., 2016). The Windrush scandal and campaigning 
by those affected have led to (some) pushback from those deputised, the res-
ignation of a Home Secretary, (limited) policy row-back from politicians and 
help for a small group of people affected to be retrospectively documented. 
Some Local Authorities and police forces are beginning to distance them-
selves from the hostile environment (although some others are doing quite 
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the opposite), with the National Police Chiefs Council on modern slavery 
and organised immigration crime stating that the police had an ‘inappropri-
ate relationship’ with immigration enforcement and would no longer auto-
matically check the immigration status of victims of crimes. Several Royal 
Colleges of medicine and medical NGOs have spoken-out about immigra-
tion checks and data-sharing spreading into healthcare (e.g. RCP, 2018) and 
new NGOs have been established to campaign against hostile environment 
in schools (Against Borders for Children) and universities (Unis Resist Border 
Controls). Even the Home Office is softening its rhetoric and speaking of 
‘compliance’ rather than hostility, although the policies remain mostly intact.
Conclusion
This article argues that the hostile environment for migrants is a specific 
policy approach and represents a significant development in the UK’s 
immigration strategy by effectively admitting that governments cannot 
meaningfully enforce immigration laws or ensure impermeable borders. 
Although the Home Office remains responsible for operationalising the 
immigration system, the hostile environment ‘deputises’ responsibilities, 
devolving the spaces and agents of immigration policing across everyday 
society, and making an unprecedented range of agencies, services, institu-
tions, companies, charities and private individuals responsible for check-
ing immigration status, passing on information to the Home Office and 
delivering immigration-related exclusions. The policies were based on little 
evidence, planning or monitoring, they do not appear to have meaningful 
impact on immigration numbers, and serious questions arise over their eth-
ics, efficiency, effectiveness and logic. There are high costs for the public 
purse, health, safety, security and society, including by erecting barriers to 
healthcare and undermining equality and social cohesion through encourag-
ing xenophobia and racism. Moreover, by being based on erroneous assump-
tions regarding immigration status, documentation and the reliability of 
Home Office data, as well as legitimising discrimination and encouraging 
overzealous application, the hostile environment expands the subordinated 
‘illegal’ category of persons, drawing-in citizens and lawful migrants in the 
process.
Despite a political aspiration for affecting migration arrival and removal 
rates, the hostile environment is not merely an immigration policy. It is a 
deliberate attempt to ‘devolve’ responsibility for border policing, diffusing it 
throughout British society, and to curtail the lives of certain people – particu-
larly those racialised and impoverished (Anderson, 2013; El-Enany, 2020) 
- leaving them physically present, but criminalised, marginalised and precari-
ous. The hostile environment is a moral and punitive political stance; creating 
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and disciplining ‘deportable’ people (de Genova, 2002; Flynn, 2015), sustain-
ing racialised colonial hierarchies (El-Enany, 2020) and requiring UK resi-
dents to inflict considerable harm on each other, with profoundly significant 
consequences for individuals and broader society.
It is especially concerning, then, that lessons have not been learned as 
a result of the Windrush scandal. Although some Local Authorities, police 
forces and doctors have spoken out about the hostile environment in recent 
years, the hostile environment remains firmly embedded in primary and sec-
ondary legislation and professional services and culture. Indirect immigration 
enforcement is also expected to be the primary means of policing immigration 
after Brexit, given that EEA nationals will probably have visa-free access to 
the UK but face restrictions on their right to work and access public services. 
As it stands, existing EEA residents of the UK are personally responsible 
for applying for settled status even if they are automatically entitled and are 
given electronic rather than hardcopy evidence of their status. Assuming – as 
seems certain – that after Brexit the consequences for failing immigration 
checks will continue to be dire, as it stands the problems demonstrated by 
Windrush will inevitably be repeated.
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